The Spread Mind by Riccardo Manzotti

Author:Riccardo Manzotti
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Science
Publisher: OR Books
Published: 2017-01-08T16:00:00+00:00

Figure 15. Jonty Hurvitz’s Hurvitz Singularity is a spatially composite object.

Figure 16. Bernard Pras’s Dalí. Anamorphic sculpture as composite objects.

The case of the red apple is simpler since its constituents—the red peel, the spherical mass of pulp—are in the same location at the same time. They produce a joint causal effect much more easily than the spatiotemporally scattered flying pink elephant. In practice, but only contingently, most visual systems allow the red apple to exist. Assembling the flying pink elephant is more difficult since it requires, at least, three distinct causal pathways picking up three different constituents from one’s lifetime: something pink, something flying, and an elephant. Yet, as the example of false mirrors shows, sometimes a perception takes place in unusual ways. Multiple causal pathways allow spatiotemporally scattered elements to act together.

Everyday perception is constrained by the spatial and temporal order of objects and their properties.66 Only red apples and the like are perceived. Yet, a partially transparent mirror or a kaleidoscope can make a difference in the causal geometry of the world. A neural system causally coupled with gazillions of events can make a bigger difference.

An object is an actual cause thanks to two factors: on the side of the constituents and on the side of the perceiver’s body. A few examples will help. A brass sphere acts as a sphere with little help from the surroundings circumstances. A set of air pressure waves composing Leporello’s aria requires a complex auditory system connected with a sophisticated cognitive system. Contrast a painting on a wall with a heavily encrypted and compressed image of the same painting scattered across multiple files over a distributed network. The former is easily assembled by any visual system capable of singling out features grouped on a canvas. The latter requires a complex set of algorithms singling out physically wildly scattered records. Yet, once they interact with the proper combinations of physical structures, they both take place as an actual cause—no matter how complex is the necessary physical structure with which they interact.

In short, there is no ontological difference between the flying pink elephant and the red apple on my table. The difference is practical. It does not dwell on the boundary between mental and physical. Rather it is based on the extent of the causal work that a body has to do in order to interact with a given object. The three crosses seen previously exemplify the same point (Figure 4). A continuum of cases can be envisaged.

At the lower level, consider a static object like the red apple on the table. No matter how I look at it, the object is sturdy, still, stable and, to a great extent, invariant to any change of perspective. It is approximately a red sphere. Most familiar objects have the same attitude. Furthermore, such objects react consistently to movement. In fact, if I move a part of them, all their parts will move together as a whole—e.g., if I push a leg of a table, the table will move as a whole.

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